THE recent vote by which Winnipeg city council repudiated bus rapid transit (BRT) for the second time since 1990 illustrated the pitfalls of political calcuations muscling aside technical and popular ones in the shaping of a transit plan.

Yet to be achieved in any form, rapid transit has been an item of public and political discussion for 50 years in Winnipeg. A lack of ongoing and formal funding assistance from senior-level governments had posed an unyielding obstacle to getting construction of a system of some sort off the ground.

Determined to break the logjam, in December 1983 ardent Winnipeg champion Lloyd Axworthy believed he'd succeeded in delivering the sought-after largesse. Axworthy was able to secure millions in grants from the federal ministries of Transportation and Regional Industrial Expansion to be put toward the construction of a busway, the Southwest Rapid Transit Corridor. He likewise persuaded the ministries of Urban Affairs and Highways & Transportation of the Manitoba government of the day to ante up for the ride.

As a piece of political dealmaking, the Canada/Manitoba Memorandum of Understanding on Urban Bus Industrial Development was a work of rare artfulness and finesse. It was premised on utilizing the corridor as a "demonstration project" for "innovative bus-propulsion technologies" (such as flywheels and, storage batteries.) Winnipeg's two major bus manufacturing firms and their unions could anticipate contracts coming their way. Mr. Axworthy was convinced he'd hit a home run.

Before the City of Winnipeg could be induced to sign on, he was erased on the basepaths — his government turfed by the voters and, replaced by the Mulroney Conservatives (who scrapped the deal.)

Twenty-one fruitless years along — despite its tattered obsolescence and its failure to fire the public's and the business sector's imaginations — the Axworthy plan lingers on.

But rubber-tired buses perform poorly on Winnipeg's snowy roads. They burn diesel oil, fouling the air; whereas rail vehicles would showcase Manitoba's clean, abundant, inexpensive hydroelectric power. Cities of Winnipeg's size usually build a rail system and use buses for local service. Ottawa never built the downtown segment of its busway and is now extending its first light-rail line (while initiating construction of a second.)

Busways are more expensive than rail lines of the same carrying capacity because buses wear out faster than rail cars, the stations have to be bigger and the road has to be wide enough to allow vehicles to pass.

The proposed Southwest Transit Corridor amounts to the transit equivalent of "Hamburger Helper". It seeks to milk additional efficiencies out of the existing, all-bus system by merely aiming to cycle the bulk of buses which presently travel on Pembina Highway through shifting them onto a parallel, bus-only roadway. Winnipeg should instead grow the diversity, capacity, versatility and reach of its transit system through the addition of a high-capacity, high-speed rail component.

Bus Rapid Transit fans hugely oversell the notion that the setup acts to preserve "one-seat rides". Most passengers arriving from areas outside the BRT corridor will still need to change buses.

Knowing that busway service can be scaled back simply by withholding buses, developers will be wary of undertaking sizable investment ventures in its vicinity. They invest more confidently in buildings beside a rail line because they know the trains have to run where the rails have been laid. The smooth ride, comfortable seating, luxurious dimensions and, inherent dependability of rail vehicles are crucial in attracting the patronage of car owners.

Buses are (and always will be) the workhorses of any properly functioning transit system. With the advent of rail, the urgency of perfecting and adopting innovative, environment-friendly techniques of bus-guidance and -propulsion willl be no less than before: New Flyer and MCI accordingly will not want for incentive or work. But casting buses in the rapid-transit role (for which, rail vehicles are ideally suited) - merely invites ridicule and discredit.

The Steering Committee of TransPlan in 1995 found in a public opinion survey that 71% favoured a city-wide, rapid-transit system (expressly defined as, "a monorail or subway").

For rapid transit to be worth doing, it must be done properly: as genuine rapid transit (harnessing rail vehicles); not as, "pseudo-rapid-transit" (substituting buses). Let's hope that this time around, the politicians and planners give us what we desire.